The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations

Abstract

Firms lobby public institutions even when associations they are members of are lobbying those same institutions. This is what we conceptualise as ‘parallel lobbying’. Firms engage in parallel lobbying to monitor associations they are members of, reinforce the message delivered by the associations, provide additional or nuanced information that goes beyond the lowest common denominator, or even to break ranks from the collective position and signal a different message to the one provided by the association. Regardless of what the rationale behind these parallel meetings is, this article intends to bring new light into this phenomenon by examining the extent to which parallel lobbying occurs at the EU level and, more importantly, unveiling what firm – and association-level characteristics explain why firms exercise parallel lobbying. We rely on large-n dataset of meetings held by companies, associations, and EU public officials between 2014 and 2023. Our findings partially confirm that firm characteristics relate to parallel lobbying. Yet, the occurrence of parallel meetings seems to be mostly driven by association-level features. This study provides new insights into an under-examined phenomenon that affects the quality and legitimacy of our governance systems.