Show simple item record

dc.contributorUniversitat Ramon Llull. IQS
dc.contributor.authorGarcía Blandón, Josep
dc.contributor.authorArgilés Bosch, Josep M.
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-31T16:45:42Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-13T05:44:21Z
dc.date.available2020-03-31T16:45:42Z
dc.date.available2023-07-13T05:44:21Z
dc.date.issued2013-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/1033
dc.description.abstractThe main role of the external auditor in the classical corporate governance scheme is to verify the accounting information provided by the firms’ managers. Lengthy audit engagements are viewed as a main threat to preserve auditor independence, and therefore regulators have established mandatory rotation rules in many countries worldwide. Researchers, however, have addressed the analysis of audit independence mainly by evaluating the role of the auditor not as an accounting verifier but as a substitute of bankruptcy prediction models. Our results show that the likelihood of audit qualifications decreases with audit tenure. This result is robust to the inclusion in the model of a proxy of accounting quality. Therefore, the potential explanation for this finding based on higher accounting quality associated to lengthy audit engagements is rejected. This threat to the independence of the external auditor has not been considered in the mandatory rotation rules established in most countries that only requires the rotation of the audit partner.eng
dc.format.extent24 p.cat
dc.language.isoengcat
dc.publisherUniversidad de Chilecat
dc.relation.ispartofEstudios de Economía. Vol. 40, No. 2 (2013), pág. 133-156cat
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
dc.rights© Universidad de Chile
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.sourceRECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.otherAuditoria--Espanyacat
dc.subject.otherControl de qualitat--Auditoriacat
dc.subject.otherAuditor independencecat
dc.subject.otherQualified opinioncat
dc.subject.otherAuditor tenurecat
dc.subject.otherAudit qualitycat
dc.titleAudit tenure and audit qualifications in a low litigation risk setting: an analysis of the spanish marketcat
dc.title.alternativeTenencia de auditorías y calificaciones de auditorías en un ambiente de bajo riesgo de litigios: un análisis del mercado españolcat
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlecat
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioncat
dc.rights.accessLevelinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.embargo.termscapcat
dc.subject.udc336
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-52862013000200002cat


Files in this item

 

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Share on TwitterShare on LinkedinShare on FacebookShare on TelegramShare on WhatsappPrint