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dc.contributorUniversitat Ramon Llull. IQS
dc.contributor.authorGarcía Blandón, Josep
dc.contributor.authorArgilés Bosch, Josep M.
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-20T16:20:41Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-13T05:44:19Z
dc.date.available2020-04-20T16:20:41Z
dc.date.available2023-07-13T05:44:19Z
dc.date.issued2017-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/1031
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the impact of firm and partner tenure on audit quality, where audit quality is proxied by discretionary accruals. We study a sample of Spanish listed companies between 2005 and 2011 and address both the individual and the interaction effects of firm and partner tenure. Our study is motivated by the current debate, particularly intense at the EU level, on the impact of the auditor rotation regime on the quality of auditing. We find that, without considering the interaction effects, firm and partner tenure do not seem to play a relevant role as determinants of audit quality. Importantly, the interaction of firm and partner tenure shows stronger effects on audit quality than both forms of tenure separately considered. Finally, our analysis suggests that audit quality is maximized when medium firm and partner tenures interact. However, results for the interaction variables are sensitive to the accruals estimation method.eng
dc.format.extent34 p.cat
dc.language.isoengcat
dc.publisherTaylor and Franciscat
dc.relation.ispartofAccounting and Business Research. Vol.47, n.7 (2017), p.810-830cat
dc.rights© Taylor and Francis. Tots els drets reservats
dc.sourceRECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.otherAuditoria--Espanyacat
dc.subject.otherEmpreses auditorescat
dc.subject.otherComptabilitatcat
dc.subject.otherAudit qualitycat
dc.subject.otherDiscretionary accrualscat
dc.subject.otherInteraction effectscat
dc.titleThe interaction effects of firm and partner tenure on audit qualitycat
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlecat
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersioncat
dc.rights.accessLevelinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.embargo.termscapcat
dc.subject.udc33
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2017.1289073cat


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