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<title>Contribucions a congressos</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/6178" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/6178</id>
<updated>2026-04-27T16:51:52Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-04-27T16:51:52Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Measuring Corporate Governance Using Antitakeover Provisions: A Dynamically Weighted Approach</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/6186" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Dumitrescu, Ariadna</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Zakriya, Mohammed</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/6186</id>
<updated>2026-04-25T02:01:07Z</updated>
<published>2024-05-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Measuring Corporate Governance Using Antitakeover Provisions: A Dynamically Weighted Approach
Dumitrescu, Ariadna; Zakriya, Mohammed
This paper presents the "nG (new Governance) Index", an unequal-weighted measure of corporate governance that dynamically captures the heterogeneity of its individual antitakeover components, as an alternative to the equal-weighted indices proposed in the related literature. Our findings show that all antitakeover provisions do not equally contribute to the firms' corporate governance quality, and our proposed nG-Index therefore traces the governance--performance relationship more persistently than an equal-weighted measure does. Further analysis reveals that an nG-Index based zero-investment hedge, going long on a poor governance portfolio and shorting the good governance one, would generate an abnormal return of over 1.28% per month, or about 15% per year. In contrast, a comparable hedge using equal-weighted index shows no significant abnormal returns.
</summary>
<dc:date>2024-05-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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