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The Pro-Independence Movement in Catalonia: Impact on the International Agenda and Media Pluralism

ABSTRACT

This chapter analyses the media coverage of the Catalan pro-independence movement, focusing on its impact on the media agenda and on the pluralism of the coverage. Adopting both a quantitative and qualitative approach, the study evaluates just under 4,800 news items and other samples of commentary from Catalonia, Spain and the international media. The timeframe begins with the National Day of Catalonia in 2012 (11 September) and ends just after the elections to the Catalan Parliament on 25 November of the same year. This was the point at which the Catalan independence movement became a major international news story. An analysis of the articles generated reveals the increasing polarization in Spain, but also the efforts of the Catalan media to adopt a more pluralist approach to the societal divisions.

Introduction

Among the most powerful of all recent national identity claims must be that of Catalonia, part of a peninsula that has been called a mini-continent, part of the Spanish hegemony for centuries, and yet still for many of its inhabitants a place apart, a wholeness of itself. If anyone had been in any doubt about the strength of that claim, it was to be manifested most overtly in the events that followed a certain public gathering of Catalans in 2012, events that are brought out and brought up to date in this chapter.

The present study is the first carried out with the objective of analysing the impact on the international media of the movement in favour of the independence of Catalonia. In addition, it is relevant that the study covers both conventional media – print, radio, television – and digital. As far as we know, no comparable analysis has been carried out more recently, neither in respect to its international dimension nor with regard to the number of media and journalistic pieces covered.

The investigation not only robustly embraces a significant number of items – 4,795 journal pieces from more than 100 Catalan, Spanish and international media sources – but was complemented by interviews with the presidents and members of two Catalan governments. The combination of such qualitative data with quantitative and content analyses enriches the results and gives more meaning to the conclusions drawn.

Furthermore, our analysis was conducted on a key period for the pro-independence movement, from 11 September 2012 (Catalan National Day) until a few days after the elections to the Catalan Parliament on 25 November that same year.¹ It was at this time that the new and much greater scale of the civil and political independence movement, dominating Catalan and Spanish political life then as it still does today, put it firmly on the national and international public, political and media agenda.

That year, on the second Tuesday of September, hundreds of thousands of people travelled by car, motorcycle, bus and train from all over Catalonia to Barcelona city centre, coming together not to commemorate a victory, but rather in memory of a heavy defeat over 300 years ago, in 1714.² However, on that pleasant afternoon in 2012, no one was thinking about old defeats. On the contrary, the atmosphere was festive and peaceful and, although there was tension in the air, nobody expected, at least not to such an extent, that celebration of the Catalan National Day would become

- 1 The Catalan Parliament is called the Generalitat after its 1359 founding name.
- 2 Each year, on 11 September, National Day commemorates the capture of Barcelona by Castilian and French troops who supported the Borbón dynasty. Barcelona and Catalonia, which were defeated, were in favour of Archduke Carlos, of the Austrian dynasty. After the War of Succession, the people endured an extremely harsh repression, Catalan institutions and laws were suppressed and Castilian was imposed as the language of administration.

the largest demonstration ever seen in Catalonia, more massive even than the renowned 1977 rally in which the general public flooded the streets to demand, less than two years after the death of Franco, ‘Llibertat, amnistia i Estatut d’Autonomia!’ [Freedom, amnesty and the Statute of Autonomy].³ Additionally, it was more numerous than the demonstration against the Iraq war in February 2003.

The 2012 demonstration (Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals [CCMA] 2012; *The Guardian*, 11 September 2012) rallied under a very different slogan from that in 1977: ‘Catalonia, nou Estat d’Europa’ [Catalonia, new European State]. The Catalan government and the Barcelona police jointly estimated the official attendance figure at 1.5 million people. For its part, the Spanish government reduced the count to 600,000. This demonstration was regarded by the international press as the great starting point of the most recent Catalan civil and political movement for self-determination and independence. According to official figures, Catalonia had a population in 2012 of around 7.5 million, or about 16 per cent of the total Spanish population, and its GDP accounted for about 19 per cent of the Spanish total.

The protesters waved Catalan flags as in 1977 – but *esteladas* (the independentist Catalan flags with a star) – were mostly to be seen.⁴ Among the slogans on display at that time were several in English, such as ‘Freedom for Catalonia’ or ‘Yes, we CAT’. The desire to present their demands to Europe and the world at large has always been foremost in the minds of the sovereigntists – in favour of Catalonia being able to decide its own future through a referendum on independence – and in the mind of the independentists – in favour of Catalonia becoming a new independent state. President Artur Mas and subsequently President Carles Puigdemont trusted

3 All translations are by the authors. The Statute of Autonomy, which would set the parameters of self-government of Catalonia within the Spanish state, was approved in 1979.

4 The *estelada* [star] flag was inspired by the Cuban and Puerto Rican flags (it is like the Catalan flag, four red stripes on a yellow background) but adds an isosceles triangle – yellow or blue – with a five-pointed star – red or white – at the centre of the triangle.

that, if the dispute between Catalonia and the central government of Spain became aggravated, the EU would intervene and even force negotiations.

The protest was organized by the Catalan National Assembly (ANC),⁵ an entity that seeks Catalan independence and whose formal foundation had occurred only a few months before. After the resounding success of the 2012 event, the ANC became, along with Òmnium Cultural (an organization established in 1961 during the Franco dictatorship and dedicated to defending and promoting Catalan language and culture), one of the two largest civil drivers of the Catalan self-determination and independence movement. The 11 September 2012 demonstration was headed by representatives of the ANC and the Association of Municipalities for Independence (AMI). This partnership brought together the Catalan city councils supporting independence.

The president of the Catalan government, Artur Mas, of the centre-right autonomist coalition Convergence and Union (CiU),⁶ did not consider it appropriate to attend the rally, given his institutional position. However, he did encourage others to participate. In fact, many leading coalition representatives attended: the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya [Republican Left of Catalonia] (ERC), and the left-wing Iniciativa per Catalunya Verd-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa [Initiative for Catalonia Greens-United Left and Alternative] (ICV-EUiA), as well as some members of the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), federated to the Socialist Spanish Workers Party (PSOE).

For many, 2012 heralded the resurgence of Catalan sovereignism and separatism not only because of the massive September demonstration, but also because of the early elections called after the refusal of the Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, to negotiate a new funding system for Catalonia with the Artur Mas government. This demonstration and the subsequent elections would signal a change in strategy for the majority of

- 5 All acronyms that appear in the text are those that correspond to the names in Catalan, except for the Spanish parties PP and the PSOE.
- 6 Coalition between the *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* [Democratic Convergence of Catalonia] (CDC) and the *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* [Democratic Union of Catalonia] (UDC).

Catalan nationalists, which went from asking for greater self-government, an approach based on devolution, to demanding a referendum so that the Catalans themselves could decide on independence.

Objectives

In this focus on the key year of 2012 our intent is to address two significant aspects of the independence process in Catalonia. The first objective is to analyse to what extent, at that point in time and subsequently, sovereigntism managed to convert its political independence claim into a relevant issue on the international public agenda. Our second goal is to check whether, as claimed by the Spanish government of Mariano Rajoy and the political parties opposed to Catalan independence – which have repeatedly denounced the ‘adocrinamiento’ [indoctrination] of the population by the Catalan media – these media were in fact in favour of self-determination and independence or not. This verification was carried out by comparing the praxis of the Catalan media with that of the Spanish media, focusing on prominent pundits and collaborators.

The Spanish State and the Independence Process

Early Elections

Just one week had elapsed after the great 2012 rally, when the then King of Spain, Juan Carlos I, in an unprecedented initiative, published a web letter defending the unity of Spain and, after referring to the harsh economic crisis ravaging Spain and Europe, added resoundingly: ‘En estas

circunstancias, lo peor que podemos hacer es dividir fuerzas, alentar disensiones, perseguir quimeras, ahondar heridas' [In these circumstances, the worst thing we can do is to divide forces, encourage dissension, chase after ghosts, and rub salt into wounds] (De Borbón 2012). The letter came as a surprise as, rather than maintaining a neutral stance, it constituted a clear intervention in a matter of a political nature by the monarchy.⁷ Moreover, the Spanish government, headed by the leader of the Partido Popular [Popular Party] (PP), Mariano Rajoy, who had been in power for less than a year, considered that the massive response to the call for the demonstration was attributable to the unrest caused by the economic crisis.

On 20 September, two days after the king's intervention, the president of the Generalitat, Artur Mas, travelled to Madrid to meet Mariano Rajoy in an atmosphere of considerable political tension. However, the goal was clear: to demand the negotiation of a new funding agreement for the Catalan regional community.⁸ At that time, the main goal of the Generalitat government was the resolution of the Catalan funding problems – a topic that we will come back to later – that is, they officially avoided demanding a referendum on self-determination or independence.

The meeting ended with Rajoy's refusal to negotiate a financing system with Catalonia that at least partially softened the fiscal deficit (the difference between the money Catalonia receives and the contribution to the State's coffers from Catalans and Catalan companies). For the period 1986–2014, the average deficit with the state calculated by the Generalitat was 8 per cent of GDP (according to the monetary flow method). If the cost-benefit method is used, this figure is 6 per cent. In 2014, the most recent year for which statistics are available, the fiscal deficit was 8.4 per

7 Juan Carlos I, and later his eldest son and successor, Felipe VI, have spoken on some occasions about the dispute between the government of Madrid and Barcelona. In all, their position was to support the central government. The position of the Spanish monarchy is in contrast to that shown by Elizabeth II to the Scottish referendum of 2014.

8 This is the official name given to administrations of the 'nacionalidades y regiones' [nationalities and regions] (Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution) that make up the Spanish State.

cent (monetary flow method) or 5.9 per cent (cost-benefit method) of Catalan GDP, equivalent to 16,570 and 11,590 million euro respectively.⁹

After the total failure of the Madrid meeting between Rajoy and Mas, the situation escalated. The president of the Generalitat reacted by calling early elections in Catalonia and along with CiU promised the general public that a referendum on self-determination would allow all to decide for themselves on their own future. In those regional elections held on 25 November 2012, the CiU coalition went from sixty-two seats down to fifty (the Catalan house has 135 seats), while the ERC independence party went up to twenty-one, a gain of eleven more than before. For the first time, the *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* [Popular Unity Candidacy] (CUP), a separatist anti-capitalist and pro-independence radical-left formation, entered Parliament (Generalitat de Catalunya 2012). These three forces became from then on the political drivers of the independence process. In 2012, the independence movement won seventy-four seats in parliament, that is to say, surpassing the sixty-eight seats required for an absolute majority. Turnout rose to 67.7 per cent, nine points above the Catalan elections that had taken place in 2010.

In late 2012, the *Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió* [Centre for Opinion Studies] (CEO), offering the most reliable poll among those conducted on the political situation in Catalonia, published its monthly barometer results. The fieldwork – a sample of 2,500 interviews – was done between 22 and 31 October. According to the CEO, at that time 35 per cent of the Catalans interviewed felt themselves to be as much Spanish as Catalan. The sum of those who felt more Spanish than Catalan or only Spanish was 4.5 per cent. Conversely, those who declared themselves more Catalan than Spanish, or Catalan only, rose to 58.3 per cent. Supporters of Catalan independence represented 44.3 per cent of respondents, while supporters of a federal Spain accounted for 25.5 per cent. Supporters of Catalonia remaining an autonomous region were 19.1 per cent, and those who advocated diminished self-government, 4 per cent (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió 2012).

In December 2012, Artur Mas and the leader of ERC, Oriol Junqueras, signed an agreement to form a government that allowed the former to be

9 Catalan Department of the Vice-Presidency, Economics and Inland Revenue, 2017.

invested as president of the Generalitat. In January, the Catalan Parliament voted the *Declaration of Sovereignty*, one of whose objectives was to pursue the referendum on self-determination. Out of the 135 possible votes, the *Declaration* received eighty-five in favour, forty-one against and two abstentions (some members of parliament did not vote). The question and the date of the future referendum were published in December. Meanwhile, Mariano Rajoy's government and the Spanish Congress of Deputies rejected allowing a referendum in Catalonia.

In 2013, what was perhaps the most spectacular demonstration so far occurred on 11 September: an estimated 1.6 million people formed a chain, holding hands along the entire length of Catalonia, from the northern border with France to the southern border with the autonomous Valencian Community, a distance of about 400 kilometres (TV3, 2013). The Catalan chain was inspired by the so-called Baltic chain, which in 1989 united the capitals of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Finally, the announced referendum had to be transformed into a non-binding 'procés participatiu' [participatory process] and was held on 9 November 2014 (a few weeks after the referendum on the independence of Scotland). Almost 81 per cent of the more than 2.3 million who voted (out of an estimated 5.4 million eligible Catalans) were in favour of independence.

Background: The Failure of the Statute

Jordi Pujol (CiU), who was president of Catalonia for nearly twenty-three years, was always reluctant to reform the 1979 Statute of Autonomy. He thought it might be counter-productive, that is, he feared that it might end up harming Catalan interests.¹⁰ In the 1995 Catalan election campaign the need to change the statute to respond to the needs and aspirations of the Catalan people had already been highlighted by the main opposition candidate, the Socialist Joaquim Nadal. This initiative was unsuccessful at

10 For the governments of Jordi Pujol, see volumes 1 and 2 of his memoirs (Pujol 2011; 2012) as well as the works of Antich (1994) and Álvaro (2014).

that time, as Pujol managed to form a government and continue to preside over the Generalitat. However, it was taken up again by Nadal's replacement as Socialist presidential candidate, the former mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall. In 2003, an alliance of the left (PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA) won the elections for the first time, dethroning CiU and taking over regional power in Catalonia. During this campaign, Maragall had promised a new Statute of Autonomy, a basic pledge that, nevertheless, also contained an element of electoral tactics and a move to attract those who would ultimately be its main allies in the new cabinet: ERC.

During that election campaign in 2003, specifically on 13 November (the voting would take place three days later), the socialist José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the Spanish prime minister at that time, proclaimed to 16,000 people gathered at a rally in Barcelona: 'Apoyaré la reforma del Estatuto de Catalunya que apruebe el Parlamento de Catalunya' [I will support the reform of the Catalan Statute approved by the Catalan Parliament]. Maragall was exultant. Later it would turn out that Rodríguez Zapatero – who had declared himself to be in favour of what he called 'España plural' [plural Spain] – had promised something he was not going to deliver. Maragall's tripartite left-wing coalition, the result of what was known as the *Tinell Pact* among the left-wing parties, would rule for three years until its chequered career, marked by tension and rivalry between its partners, precipitated the call for a new election in 2006. During those three years, great energy was invested in the drafting of a revised Statute of Autonomy that would replace that of 1979. In 2006, the leftist coalition managed to retain the government – led by a new socialist president – José Montilla.

From the very beginning, the wording of the draft statute was subject to great difficulties, in part because of disagreements among government members (ERC being a pro-independence party and the PSC, Maragall's party, federated with the Spanish PSOE). There were also ongoing differences between leftist parties and CiU representatives. The latter, despite having won more seats in the elections, had been removed from power and did not fail to take advantage of the new statute drafting to put pressure on the members of the tripartite coalition, favouring bolder wording and, at the same time, seeking to provoke contradictions among the ruling left. CiU had a significant ace in the hole: without their acceptance of the

project it would not flourish, given that the statute needed a qualified majority to pass. On 30 September 2005, the Catalan Parliament finally gave its approval to the proposal of an organic law amending the Statute: the leftists with CiU voted 120 in favour, and PP voted fifteen against. Once the proposed new statute was approved in Catalonia it needed to be sent to the Spanish Parliament for approval.

In January 2006, the president of the PP, Mariano Rajoy, then in opposition in Spain, began a campaign to promote wider public opposition to the Catalan Statute. To this end, tables were set up in different Spanish cities, including Barcelona, with the aim of collecting signatures – in all, about 4 million were obtained. The move angered the Catalan parties that supported the new Statute, with many incidents between the Catalan and Spanish representatives during the negotiations.

The process ended up being refloated in a meeting between José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and the opposition leader in Catalonia, Artur Mas (CiU), which ended on the night of 21 January 2006. The event took place at the Moncloa Palace, the official residence of the president of the central government. Although the Catalan nationalists of Mas were not numerically significant in the Spanish Parliament, the PSOE did not want in any way to be left out of the agreement on the Statute. The consequent accord reached by Mas and Zapatero angered members of the government of the Generalitat, particularly ERC, which rejected the text resulting from the negotiations with Madrid; this would lead to new elections in Catalonia.

On 8 April 2006, the then vice-president of the Spanish government and deputy general secretary of the PSOE, Alfonso Guerra, who presided over the Constitutional Commission during the handling of the Statute, had declared at a PSOE youth congress that the draft was 'infumable' [untenable] and therefore had to be polished or 'cepillado' [planed down] by the Commission like wood in the hands of carpenters.¹¹ In addition to calling for opposition by the PP and ERC, he also asked for a no vote from the CUP (at that time an extra-parliamentary political organisation). However, the Spanish Parliament, the Congress of Deputies and the Senate,

11 Guerra made these controversial statements during his speech at the PSOE youth congress held in Baracaldo (in the Basque Country).

after much discussion, definitively approved the draft on 10 May 2006. On 18 June, the Catalan general public were called to a referendum to approve or reject the new Statute of Autonomy, but the duration of the process, the cuts made in the text and the fatigue of Catalan society led to an abstention rate of 50.6 per cent. The text was endorsed by 73.9 per cent of the vote.

Following the referendum, there was a cascade of appeals before the *Tribunal Constitucional* [Constitutional Court] (TC), all on the grounds that the statute was excessive in terms of power granted to Catalonia and was at odds with the 1978 Spanish Constitution. The first to file an appeal was the PP, claiming that it was a parallel constitution and challenging 114 out of a total of 223 articles of the text, a good number of which are expressed in a similar way in the Andalusian Statute currently in force. The Andalusian Statute was approved in 2006 with the votes of PP and endorsed by the Andalusians in 2007. Then the Spanish Ombudsman appealed against the Catalan Statute, along with five regional communities governed not only by the PP but also by the PSOE.¹²

The debate within the TC would last until 2010. In 2009, with the imminent possibility of an unfavourable judgement, twelve Catalan newspapers published a joint editorial in defence of the Statute. The article was entitled 'La dignitat de Catalunya'/'La dignidad de Catalunya' [The Dignity of Catalonia] and warned of the historic significance of the decision that the members of the Constitutional Court had at hand. It also denounced manoeuvres to alter the balance of forces within that court and the anomalous situation in which the institution found itself. The editorial referred to the fact that the appointment of one judge had been refused, one place remained empty after the death of its incumbent, and four other judges (the TC consists of twelve seats) had continued in office after their term expired. The text warned: 'No ens confonguem, el dilema real és avanç o retrocés; acceptació de la maduresa democràtica d'una Espanya plural, o el seu bloqueig'/'No nos confundamos, el dilema real es avance o retroceso; aceptación de la madurez democrática de una España plural, o el bloqueo

12 These communities were autonomous regions: Murcia, La Rioja, Aragón, Valencia and the Balearic Islands.

de esta' [Let us not be confused, the real dilemma is advancement or regression; acceptance of the democratic maturity of a plural Spain, or the blocking of this].

Then it gave further information on this, evoking the agreements that made the transition from dictatorship to democracy possible in Spain:

Estan en joc els pactes profunds que han fet possible els 30 anys més virtuoses de la història d'Espanya. I arribats a aquest punt és imprescindible recordar un dels principis vertebradors del nostre sistema jurídic, d'arrel romana: *Pacta sunt servanda*. Allò pactat obliga./Están en juego los pactos profundos que han hecho posible los treinta años más virtuosos de la historia de España. Y llegados a este punto es imprescindible recordar uno de los principios vertebrales de nuestro sistema jurídico, de raíz romana: *Pacta sunt servanda*. Lo pactado obliga.

[What is at stake are the profound pacts that have made the thirty virtuous years of the history of Spain possible. And at this point it is essential to recall one of the central principles of our legal system, of Roman origin: *Pacta sunt servanda*. Pacts must be complied with.]

Finally, the editorial predicted:

[P]erò ningú que conegui Catalunya posarà en dubte que el reconeixement de la identitat, la millora de l'autogovern, l'obtenció d'un finançament just i un salt qualitatiu en la gestió de les infraestructures són i continuaran sent reclamacions tenaçment plantejades amb un amplíssim suport polític i social./[P]ero nadie que conozca Catalunya pondrá en duda que el reconocimiento de la identidad, la mejora del autogobierno, la obtención de una financiación justa y un salto cualitativo en la gestión de las infraestructuras son y seguirán siendo reclamaciones tenazmente planteadas con un amplísimo apoyo político y social.

[But nobody who knows Catalonia will doubt that the recognition of identity, improvement of self-government, obtaining a fair share of funding and a qualitative leap in the management of infrastructures are and will continue to be tenaciously defended with very broad political and social support.] (*La Vanguardia*, 26 November 2009).

When eventually, in July 2010, the Constitutional Court issued its judgement on the Statute of Autonomy, the resolution did not have unanimity among the judges. The ruling left the term 'nación' [nation] without legal validity in the preamble of the Statute. In addition, it annulled the pre-tensions on the Catalan language, on the establishment of an autonomous

judiciary power and on improving the financing of Catalonia. In total, fourteen articles were annulled and twenty-seven were conditioned by the interpretation defined by the Constitutional Court judges. The ruling caused great consternation in most of Catalan society, with the socialist president of the Generalitat, José Montilla, addressing the Catalans to emphasize his ‘indignación’ [indignation], criticizing the PP’s attitude and noting that the Constitutional Court was ‘lamentablemente desacreditado y moralmente deslegitimado’ [lamentably discredited and morally delegitimized] to issue that statement.¹³

On 10 July 2010, a protest demonstration organized by Òmnium Cultural passed through the centre of Barcelona under the slogan ‘Som una nació, nosaltres decidim’ [We are a nation, we decide]. This slogan can be interpreted as a direct allusion to the strange situation created since the TC substantially modified a Statute of Autonomy not only approved by the Catalan and Spanish parliaments, but also endorsed by the public. With the exception of the PP and Citizens (*Ciudadanos*), the demonstration received the support of most of the political parties of the Catalan Parliament, as well as many Catalan public figures, the unions and nearly 1,600 Catalan civil organizations. The president of the Catalan government, José Montilla, was at the front of the demonstration. The Statute that ultimately came into force was substantially different from that which the Catalan citizens had endorsed through a referendum.¹⁴

From Reformism to Independentism

From the restoration of Spanish democracy, Catalan nationalism had mostly opted for political reform in Spain and its economic modernization, confident that with this, acceptance of the diverse nature of the state would lead to recognition of the distinct identity of the Catalan people. Catalan nationalism, which in its political dimension has its origins in

13 From the institutional statement by President Montilla on 28 June, 2010.

14 For the independence process in Catalonia, see Minder (2017); on the contemporary history of Catalonia, see McRoberts (2001) and Dowling (2013).

the late nineteenth century (Balsells 1992; Cacho Viu 1998; Keating 1996; Solé Tura 1985; Termes 1999) has been defined by Guibernau as ‘emancipatory nationalism’, which she describes as ‘a democratic type of nationalism emerging in nations included within larger states who do not identify with them, who do not feel represented by the states of which they are a part and who do not feel politically and culturally recognized by the state containing them’. This same author also highlighted that the will of the British government to recognize Scotland as a nation and its willingness to allow a referendum on independence contrasted with the Spanish position to ban the referendum in Catalonia (Guibernau 2013: 372).

Catalan nationalism – which has always maintained a clear pro-European stance – was constructed from the 1960s on, in one of the movements in opposition to the dictatorship of General Franco, close to the left (mainly Communists and Socialists). Since Franco’s death in 1975, this would effectively contribute to the stabilization of the Spanish political situation and facilitate the advent of the new democratic regime, the Transition. And it would remain so from the restoration of the Generalitat of Catalonia and the first regional elections in 1980. Surprisingly, those elections were won by Jordi Pujol and CiU, which ousted the two main leftist parties, the PSC and the communist Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC)]. Pujol would remain in power for almost twenty-three years until the arrival of the government of Pasqual Maragall hand-in-hand with the Tripartite Left. During three government terms, Pujol enjoyed an absolute majority in the Generalitat. Throughout their successive mandates, CiU laid the foundations of Catalonia today and its current welfare system (health, education, social policy, and so on). This period was also characterized by defence of the Catalan language and culture, supported by the productive economy and by better funding and investment for Catalonia.

Pujol and the CiU group in the Congress of Deputies in Madrid, always in exchange for trade-offs, provided for the necessary parliamentary support for both the PSOE and the PP when one of them did not have a sufficient majority. Similarly, they supported the governments in regard to the entry of Spain into the European Community (1986) and the Euro system (1999) and when the time came to address the crisis that erupted in Spain and Europe in 2008. Ideologically close to the Christian Democrats

and a fervent pro-European, Jordi Pujol always promoted negotiation and agreement with the powers-that-be in Madrid, and opposed independence, to the extent that, as noted above, he consistently rejected reform of the Statute of Autonomy of 1979. Things changed considerably between 2003, when Pujol left power, and 2010, when judgement was pronounced on the new Statute. If we look at the opinion polls on the Catalans' position, we realize that from 2000 to 2010 the position favourable to independence became progressively stronger. For a variety of reasons, the Catalans' perception had changed in regard to the relationship between Catalonia – whose origins date back over 1,000 years – and the Spanish State.

The growth of the sovereignty and independence movement in Catalonia has multiple origins. Certainly, a significant cause has its origin in frustration and outrage that parts of the Statute already approved by Catalan citizens in a referendum were deleted or revised or differently interpreted by the Spanish Parliament and the Constitutional Court. But other origins are also particularly relevant. For example, a second element is the belief that the accumulation of very high annual fiscal deficits – which have already been discussed here – were severely damaging Catalonia and the welfare of the general public. This issue, combined with the economic crisis that erupted in 2008, undoubtedly contributed to dissatisfaction with the Spanish government's treatment of Catalonia. A third major element presents greater difficulties of definition, because there is a less tangible cause. This is the perception, widespread in Catalonia, that political and institutional Spain not only fails to recognize or appreciate its own internal diversity but in many cases treats Catalonia with contempt or worse, as evidenced by attempts to suppress key features of its identity. Among the most important of such features is the Catalan language, spoken in the regional autonomies of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, in the area of Aragon bordering Catalonia and, beyond the Spanish borders, in Andorra, in the south of France (Northern Catalonia) and in the town of Alghero on the island of Sardinia.

In relation to this, perhaps one of the issues that has caused most dissatisfaction has been the insistence of PP – and afterwards the new party, Citizens, instituted in 2006 from a general public platform – to question the linguistic model in Catalan schools. In the system of public education, children and young people use Catalan as their first language, as it

is considered in need of protection. This model has been pursued with considerable success, as indicated on several occasions by the PISA Report that all children and young people know both languages. The PISA report notes that the reading comprehension in Spanish of Catalan students ranks above the Spanish average (Silió 2016). The PP has often attributed the defence of the Catalan language to a desire to obtain ‘privilegios’ [privileges] through ‘chantaje’ [blackmail] in the conviction that these accusations against Catalans are a profitable electoral weapon in the rest of Spain. Moreover, in José María Aznar’s second term (2000–4) another source of dissatisfaction among Catalans was the PP’s refusal to negotiate improvements to self-government by the Generalitat and its financing, together with the determination of the Spanish right to recentralize state power and convert the city of Madrid – through the concentration of economic power and huge investments in infrastructure – into a megalopolis that Barcelona could not compete with.

The Catalan draft Statute of 2006 had aimed, albeit timidly, at progress in the areas cited: identity, language and culture, as well as the economy and investment, and its failure was rejection of the different Catalonia and the different Spain it proposed. This would probably account for the fact that during the years 2000 to 2010 the independence movement gained significant ground until it stabilized at between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of all Catalan citizens.

From 2012 to the Present Day

From the ‘procés participatiu’ [participatory process] of 9 November 2014, which was held despite opposition from the Spanish state, many things have happened. From that date on, Catalan and Spanish policy entered a period marked by escalating pressure from the Spanish government and the state in general in an attempt to block the sovereigntism and independence movements, as Culla (2017), March (2018), Martí (2018) and García (2018) explain.

CiU having been dissolved in June 2014 over separatist disagreements within the coalition, when early elections to the Catalan Parliament were held on 27 September 2015, CDC and UDC ran separate campaigns. The election was won by an electoral coalition called Junts pel Sí (JxSí) [Together for Yes]. Mas wanted to give the elections a plebiscitary character to turn them into a kind of vote on independence. However, JxSí needed the pro-independence and anti-system votes of CUP to gain control of the Catalan Parliament and, in exchange for their support, CUP demanded that Mas should withdraw from the presidency of the Generalitat. In January 2016, Carles Puigdemont became the new president and five months later, in June, announced that he would call a referendum on independence.

When, during the referendum voting on 1 October 2017 – which was to proceed in spite of opposition from the Spanish government, the Constitutional Court, and the Judiciary – agents of the National Police and Civil Guard assaulted voters in a number of polling stations, the images of police violence circled the globe. Almost 2.3 million people voted, nine out of ten in favour of an independent Catalonia. King Felipe VI, in a televised speech on 3 October, described what happened as ‘deslealtad inadmissible’ [unacceptable disloyalty] and warned of the ‘extrema gravedad’ [extreme gravity] of what was happening. He stressed that the State should ensure ‘el orden constitucional’ [the constitutional order] and avoided referring to the more than 1,000 people hurt and injured. That same day there was a general strike – ‘aturada de país’ [halting of the country] – in Catalonia to protest the violence.

Puigdemont would declare Catalan independence in the Catalan Parliament on 10 October, although in the same act it was suspended pending international mediation, something which was not going to happen. Finally, on the 27th, Puigdemont declared independence. However, it was not to be implemented. The Spanish flag on the Palace of the Generalitat in Barcelona was not even hauled down, and the statement was not published in the Official Journal of the Generalitat of Catalonia, something required if it was to become law. The reaction of the Spanish State consisted of implementing Article 155 of the Constitution, which meant the immediate suspension of all Catalan government members and the takeover of the Generalitat. At the same time, elections were also called for 21

December, in which the pro-independence parties would manage to win seventy seats in parliament, two more than required for an absolute majority. The record turnout exceeded 79 per cent, with Puigdemont once again the candidate with the greatest support.

By early 2018, the principal civil and political independence leaders were either in custody – accused of serious crimes – or refugees in various European countries. Others were free, but were awaiting Spanish judicial processes – as was the chief of the Mossos de Esquadra (Catalan regional police). Puigdemont took refuge in Belgium but was later arrested in Germany while returning by road from Finland. German judges dismissed, although they had not yet definitely denied, the order for his extradition to Spain for the crime of rebellion (punishable by a maximum of thirty years imprisonment) and said that if asked they would deliberate on the accusation of embezzlement of public funds. Puigdemont and Jordi Sánchez (leader of Òmnium Cultural, in prison for the second time) were proposed as candidates for president of the Catalan government, but their legal situation prevented their inauguration. A third candidate, Jordi Turull, failed to gain the support of the CUP. The 1 October referendum brought sharply into view the attention paid by the international press to the Catalan question, and this was also to be the case with the declarations of independence on 10 and 27 October; these events served to consolidate the Catalan situation on the international agenda, which was both the impetus for our investigation and the guide to its research processes.

Methodology

The methodology consisted in the quantitative analysis of the information appearing in the press, television, radio and internet at Catalan, Spanish and international levels. The research focused on the period from 11 September 2012 (Catalan National Day) until a few days after the elections to the Catalan Parliament on 25 November that same year. The test sample starts on 10 September and extends until

30 November 2012.¹⁵ The quantitative analysis included a total of 4,795 journal pieces from more than 100 media sources: Catalan, Spanish and international.¹⁶ The investigation was complemented by author interviews of members of the two different Catalan governments, including its presidents. The pieces can be characterized as follows:

- selected information published in printed newspapers;
- news programmes from selected radio and television channels;
- news distributed by selected digital newspapers;
- the main radio and television current affairs programmes including news, interviews, talk-shows and political debates.

However, the principal object of analysis was the headline for all media, whether print, radio, television or Internet.

Media Sampling

For the purpose of the investigation, and with the exception of the international press, the sample was selected for each outlet and territory according to the criterion of coverage and influence of each of these media. To maintain a certain geographical balance, a higher number of foreign newspapers was chosen.¹⁷

Given the territorial and political framework that the emerging pro-independence movement is articulated in, we directed our attention

15 This material was quantified using indicators such as time and space occupied; the pre-eminence given to this content by the media and the secondment of contributors and experts.

16 See Appendix A for the list of all media analysed.

17 Not all media reached a sample of seven in some categories: Catalan television and radio and international digital newspapers (because the number of newspaper companies representing the area in question did not reach that figure). In the case of the internet, our study included both digital newspapers without printed press – called pure players – as well as digital editions of major newspapers of global reference.

to European media, focusing the analysis on the most influential countries among the European Union (EU) founders: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. In this selection, the UK was added, although it joined the EU project later than the others, as it is still, despite the uncertainties of Brexit, a state with considerable power and influence. In addition, the Scottish case presents characteristics similar in many ways to those of Catalonia. We have considered it worthwhile to add the United States to our selection, as a traditional ally of the EU and a pre-eminent player in the international landscape. In this way, there are many of the major trading partners of Catalonia in this sample.

We also deemed it essential to give greater attention to two of the sectors: television and the printed press. While the circulation of printed newspapers is generally declining internationally, this medium still exerts a considerable influence on political, economic, social and cultural elites. As such, both media are crucial factors in shaping public opinion. As for the printed press, we thought it necessary also to include some non-generalist but nevertheless major publications specializing in economics. The leading global audio-visual channels are reference points for many media, and so have also been included. In total the sample includes 104 communication means in seven languages: twenty-four Catalan, twenty-eight Spanish and fifty-two internationals.

In the case of audio-visual programmes, the approach was to select the midday and evening television news, and the programmes with talk shows, debates, interviews, and so on of a political nature. As for the radio, we have selected information programmes, usually in the evening, together with the most relevant current affairs programmes, which are usually broadcast in the morning. With regard to digital-only newspapers, online media units were sampled using two different procedures. From the date on which the investigation began – 15 November 2012 – we proceeded to capture all the headlines studied. The capture was always carried out at 4 p.m. For the analysis of past publications, we conducted a retrospective search. We considered that employing Google for the enquiry would provide better and more homogeneous results.¹⁸

18 For Catalan media the following categories were chosen: independència, independentisme; federalisme, federal, federalist; sobiranisme, sobiranista;

Data: Factor Analysis

Each individual piece of text information was collected and assigned the following data fields: basic identification (headline, publication, source, date and text genre) and related data on the time, place and duration, as well as the rank or position in the publication (cover or summary or home page, section, page, columns).

Among the news headlines, we differentiated between those that were referential and those that were evaluative. The referential headlines are objective and we can determine if they are true or false; the most common examples are statements such as: ‘Rajoy avisa a Mas de que “se está equivocando y mucho” [Rajoy warns Mas that ‘he is making a mistake and a bad one at that’] In these headlines, we have also focused on determining the subject of the statement. For evaluative headlines we first determined whether the assessment was positive, negative or not indicated. If the news text was an interview, then we refer to the political (or ideological) affiliation of the person concerned: unionist, independentist, federalist, or not indicated.

Opinion: Factor Analysis

For opinion texts the overall objective was twofold: first, political, ideological and professional identification of the author of the text, and second, the headline analysis. For the first objective, in addition to the basic reference data – medium, date and headline – we identified the kind of opinion article – column, external pundit contribution, in-depth article, editorial, letter to the editor, and so on – and the journalist’s

espanyolisme, centralisme, espanya, unitat. For Spanish media the categories were: independència, independentismo; federalism, federal, federalista; soberanismo, soberanista, espanyolismo, centralismo, espanya, unidad. For international media, the search was carried out thoroughly from the word ‘Catalonia’ translated into the different languages of the media studied.

credentials: author, expert, politician, and so on, as well as their ideological leaning. This part included a study of chat shows, a very popular format in Catalonia and Spain. For the second objective the headlines were classified as thematic (that is limiting themselves to the question at hand), evaluative/evaluation (issuing a judgement), or inappropriate (extremely negative or offensive). Also, as in the news elements, we indicated whether the action was presented as positive or negative, and who it was directed at or who suffered the consequences.

Results and Discussion

The first objective of our investigation was to determine whether in 2012 sovereignty had the ability to reach beyond the Spanish borders, to the extent that it was incorporated into the international public agenda. In this regard, it is significant that, of the overall total of 4,795 items analysed (see Appendix A), international media produced 233 news items through print, television and radio during our study period (4.65 per cent of the overall total), while Catalan and Spanish media published 4,562 pieces (95.35 per cent). As expected, the Catalan and Spanish media provided much more information than foreign media. From Table 11.1 (Appendix B) it can be seen that, for example, in the case of television, the total number of recorded spots was: 397 in Catalonia, 232 in Spain and twenty-five internationally – a total of 654.

In all media (print, broadcasting and digital), news items were the predominant reporting genre in Catalonia, in Spain, and in the rest of the world (Tables 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5). Regarding opinion genres, in Catalonia and Spain many more opinions were provided by columnists than by editorials, by letters to the editor or by analyses written by experts (in-depth articles and external pundit contributions). In the international media, columnists and external pundits contributed 31.3 per cent each to the overall total (Table 11.6).

Of the headlines analysed throughout the period, internationally the subject that appears most is 'Catalonia': in printed media (Table 11.7),

'Catalonia' accounts for 29.9 per cent of the headlines, while in television (Table 11.8) this ratio is much higher – rising to 70 per cent – and in online media (Table 11.9) it was 62.5 per cent. In the case of both Catalonia and Spain the subject that dominates headlines in all three media is Artur Mas, who was the then president of the government of the Generalitat. This was to be expected, given that the perspective of the international media is more detached than that of the Catalan and Spanish.

Headlines were mostly categorized as evaluative (Table 11.10). The case of the press (General) is the most striking: evaluative headlines account for 63.1 per cent versus 33.5 per cent for referential (and 3.4 per cent where the distinction was not applicable). For international television, evaluative and referential headlines were equal at 28 per cent. In the international online media, in contrast, evaluative headlines at 42.9 per cent far exceeded referential.

The typology of international headlines (Table 11.11) was considerably more negative than positive in newspapers (44.9 per cent negative versus 17.4 per cent positive, while the rest were neutral or indeterminate). For magazines, the proportion of negative (37.5 per cent) was significantly higher than positive (25 per cent); this was even more marked in the case of online media (38.5 per cent versus 7.7 per cent). However, in TV headlines the positive (37.5 per cent) were higher than the negative (25 per cent), making international television the only outlet where positive reporting exceeded negative.

The second objective of this research was to ascertain whether the allegations of bias made by the Spanish government and unionist politicians were true. The total number of opinion pieces (column, pundit, article, etc.) analysed was 1,922. Most of these opinion headlines have an evaluative function first, then thematic thereafter. Most of the inappropriate headlines occurred in the Spanish media. This tendency was clearest in online media, given that the percentage of opinion headlines presenting an inappropriate function reached 3.4 per cent. As for the leaning of print media contributors and experts (Table 11.12), perhaps the most significant point of our analysis is the strong polarization observed, although there was a greater diversity among the Catalan media than among Spanish media. In the first case, those which can be labelled as sovereigntists take precedence at

59.5 per cent. Conversely, in the Spanish media the unionists take the first place, at 71.4 per cent. The more inappropriate opinion pieces were those of the Spanish media. In addition, and taking the strong polarization into account, we can observe that the pluralism of the Catalan media is higher than that of the Spanish.

In the case of print media contributors, Table 11.12 indicates that while sovereigntists dominated in Catalonia (59.5 per cent), in Spain it is the unionists, with 71.4 per cent of the total. Table 11.13 indicates that in the Catalan online media, sovereigntists accounted for 77 per cent versus 10 per cent of unionists and 13 per cent of federalists. In the Spanish online media, the percentages were: 54.3 per cent, unionists; 11.2 per cent sovereigntists (in favour of self-determination); 14.7 per cent federalists. In radio talk shows (Table 11.14), in the case of Catalonia nearly half the pundits were sovereigntists (49.7 per cent), and in the case of Spain 61 per cent were unionists and only 1.7 per cent were sovereigntist voices for independence. For television talk-show guest ideologies (Table 11.15), in Catalonia 45.5 per cent were sovereigntists, while on Spanish television, unionist guests accounted for 69.7 per cent; unionists among Catalonia commentators comprised 15.8 per cent while in Spain the sovereigntists (separatists) made up 5.9 per cent.

The majority opinion of the Catalans, in any media, was sovereigntist. In the Spanish media, conversely, the main point of view was unionist. The Catalan digital media and the Spanish printed media included a higher percentage of opinion contributors of the respective majority currents. The greatest balance was found in the international newspapers and magazines. As for the politicians interviewed, we should highlight the fact that the Spanish press mainly interviewed, and in this order, representatives of the PP and the PP in Catalonia, then those of PSC and Citizens, condemning representatives of political parties favourable to the self-determination of Catalonia to virtual silence.

As we have seen, during the study period, 233 pieces on Catalonia were broadcast or published in the international media we analysed (Table 11.1). Today the international presence of Catalonia is perceptibly far greater than it was then, and there can be no doubt that the independence movement has become a player in an international issue. This emergence of Catalonia

on the international agenda dates from the key year of 2012 and has continued to increase and consolidate itself since. This is actually one of the principal objectives pursued by sovereigntism since 2012, the year in which, as we have seen, the movement broke out of its shell in full force. However, in that year, both Catalonia and President Mas were associated with negative actions or assessments in the international media.

In fact, after the great rally of 2012, the Generalitat government implemented a specific programme for a channel of fluid communication with international media and their correspondents in Catalonia and Spain. The programme was dubbed The Eugeni Xammar International Programme for Communications and Public Relations.¹⁹ Additionally, in November of the same year, the Catalan government agreed to give a strong impetus to diplomatic action abroad. To do this, they created the Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia (Diplocat) from the existing Catalonia World Board. Their goal was to explain the Catalan process internationally, including their aspirations to exercise the right to self-determination and independence. Diplocat, the Catalan *paradiplomacy*, which was abolished in 2017 by the Spanish government based on Article 155 of the Constitution, worked hard and contributed to making what was happening in Catalonia known internationally. The Catalan government also tried during the process to attract the attention of foreign correspondents, traditionally based in Madrid and therefore very exposed to the narratives on Catalonia propagated by the government of Rajoy and the Spanish media.²⁰

As we noted earlier, a new analysis of the international agenda would be necessary to check to what extent the presence of Catalonia and the independence movement has increased on the international agenda. It would also need to determine whether assessment at the international level

19 Eugeni Xammar (1888–1973) was a notable Catalan journalist and international correspondent, besides being a diplomat and translator.

20 One of these journalists, Sandrine Morel of *Le Monde*, a critic of sovereigntism, published a book (2018) in which she exposes the pressure of a member of the Partit Democràtic Europeu de Catalunya [European Democratic Party of Catalonia] (PDECAT), the successor of the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia, to publish articles more favourable to the pro-independence movement.

remains largely negative or whether, in light of the events from 2012 to the present, the international perception has become more positive. As we have seen, the debate in Catalonia and Spain about the Catalan aspiration to decide their own future through a referendum on self-determination, took place using terms of great polarization. There is a structural explanation for this. Catalonia and Spain can consider themselves safely included in the 'Mediterranean model or polarized pluralism' (Hallin and Mancini 2004), which is characterized by a high degree of parallelism, of correspondence, between the political system and the media. However, there is less unanimity between Catalan and Spanish media. While in the former we find a greater representation of voices against self-determination and independence, the latter tend to ostensibly minimize or marginalize the voices of sovereigntism and independence.

In this section, although we do not have global studies, we do have different analyses conducted on pluralism on television both in Catalonia and in Spain. These analyses tend to confirm our results in part. El Consell de l'Audiovisual de Catalunya [The Audiovisual Council of Catalonia] (CAC), a regulator that produced different analyses, found in a study on 1 October 2017, the referendum voting day, that, in news treatment on Catalan and Spanish television channels, TV3 (the leading Catalan public television channel) 'va oferir aquell dia més pluralitat de veus en la seva programació' [offered on that day more diversity of voices in their programming] compared with the Spanish public television (TVE) and the private Spanish Telecinco, Antena 3 TV and La Sexta (CAC 2017). Another example available is the collective study on the 2017 Catalan elections by the UK Democracy Volunteers. In the 'Media Monitoring' section, the report analysed Catalan and Spanish newspapers, radio and television, noting the strong bias against independence in the Spanish media (Ault 2017).

Also in this section, we should take into consideration an important element that relates to the structure of the Catalan media market. While the Spanish media, both written and audiovisual, have a widespread diffusion and readership/audience in Catalonia, this does not happen the other way around. Without doubt, this makes it possible for the Catalan public to receive a greater diversity of points of view than the general public

in the rest of the country. In a nutshell, we can say that 2012 was the year when the movement for Catalan independence became an issue that went beyond the Spanish borders for the first time in a loud and clear manner. Likewise, the international presence in 2012 became a prime objective of the independence movement and the Generalitat government redoubled its diplomatic efforts to publicize the Catalan situation to the world to garner support for holding a referendum.

While an assessment of Catalonia's presence on the international agenda may not have been a primary objective of this study, it is evident that this presence has been increasing progressively. However, we do not know whether international public opinion about the Catalan independence movement amounts to a positive assessment, although in this regard there might have been significant fluctuations throughout the different periods or stages since 2012. It also seems clear that the Spanish media were – and appear to continue to be – virtually unanimous in their position of rejecting a referendum on self-determination and promoting frontal condemnation of independence. As we have already said, the Spanish media are widely read and watched by the Catalan general public, something that does not happen on a reciprocal basis, which is to say that the Catalan media are hardly followed outside Catalonia. Our analysis has clearly shown that, for their part, the Catalan media made greater efforts to accommodate a diversity of opinions and views and provide more pluralism in their reporting.

More recent events have served to highlight the probability that the conflict between opposing views of nationhood and identity, in both Catalonia and Spain, is not likely to be resolved in the short term. This underscores the pressing need to continue the line of research that began with this study, the results and conclusions of which, drawn from a very wide spectrum of media opinion, not only shed light on the present independence movement in Catalonia and its impact on Spanish perceptions of statehood, but lead into and meld with other definitions of and aspirations towards identity worldwide. Continuing such analyses through further periods of time, following national and international opinions as they evolve and mutate, can only enhance our understanding of the issues involved.

Appendix A: Media Analysed

| Catalan | | | |
|----------------------------------|--|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Printed press | Television | Radio | Digital newspapers (pure players) |
| <i>La Vanguardia</i> | TV3 | Catalunya Ràdio | Vilaweb |
| <i>El Periódico de Catalunya</i> | TVE (the previously recorded news on Channels One and Two) | RAC1 | Nació Digital |
| <i>El Punt Avui</i> | 8tv | La Xarxa (COM Ràdio) | Racó Català |
| <i>Ara</i> | Barcelona TV | RNE Ràdio 4 | El Singular Digital / El Món |
| <i>Segre</i> | Canal Català | | E-notícies |
| <i>Diari de Tarragona</i> | | | Directe.cat |
| <i>Regió 7</i> | | | El Debat El Nacional |

| Spanish | | | |
|-----------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Printed press | Television | Radio | Digital newspapers (pure players) |
| <i>El País</i> | Telecinco | Cadena SER | Lainformacion.com |
| <i>El Mundo</i> | Antena 3 | Onda Cero Radio | El Confidencial |
| <i>ABC</i> | La 1 | RNE Radio 1 | Publico.es |
| <i>La Razón</i> | Cuatro | COPE | Periodista Digital |

| Spanish | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Printed press | Television | Radio | Digital newspapers (pure players) |
| <i>El Correo</i> | La Sexta | ABC Punto Radio | The Huffington Post |
| <i>La Voz de Galicia</i> | La 2 | Canal Sur Radio | Libertad Digital |
| <i>La Nueva España</i> | Intereconomía | Radio Intereconomía | El Plural |

| International | | | |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| Press | Television | Digital media | Others |
| <i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> (Germany) | BBC World (UK) | Huffington Post (US) | <i>Der Spiegel</i> (Germany) |
| <i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i> (Germany) | CNN (US) | Political (US) | <i>Stern</i> (Germany) |
| <i>Le Monde</i> (France) | Fox News (US) | Lettera 43 (Italy) | <i>Le Nouvel Observateur</i> (France) |
| <i>Le Figaro</i> (France) | Al Jazeera (Qatar) | Rue 89 (France) | <i>L'Express</i> (France) |
| <i>Il Corriere della sera</i> (Italy) | France 24 (France) | | <i>L'Espresso</i> (Italy) |
| <i>La Repubblica</i> (Italy) | ZDFinfo (Germany) | Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany) | <i>The Economist</i> (UK) |
| <i>Le Soir</i> (Belgium-Wallonia) | | | <i>Time</i> (US) |
| <i>De Standaard</i> (Belgium Flanders) | | Le Figaro (France) | <i>Newsweek</i> (US) |

| International | | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------|--------|
| Press | Television | Digital media | Others |
| <i>De Telegraaf</i> (Netherlands) | | Il Corriere della sera (Italy) | |
| <i>Volkskran</i> (Netherlands) | | | |
| <i>The Daily Telegraph</i> (UK) | | La Repubblica (Italy) | |
| <i>The Guardian</i> (UK) | | Le Soir (Belgium-Wallonia) | |
| <i>The Times</i> (UK) | | De Standaard (Belgium Flanders) | |
| <i>The New York Times</i> (US) | | De Telegraaf (Netherlands) | |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> (US) | | Volkskran (Netherlands) | |
| <i>USA Today</i> (US) | | Daily Telegraph (UK) | |
| <i>Wall Street Journal</i> (US) | | The Guardian (UK) | |
| <i>Financial Times</i> (UK) | | The Times (UK) | |
| | | The New York Times (US) | |
| | | The Washington Post (US) | |
| | | USA Today (US) | |
| | | The Wall Street Journal (US) | |
| | | Financial Times (UK) | |

Appendix B: Analyses

Table 11.1: Number of journal pieces

| | Catalonia | Spain | International | Total |
|---------------|-----------|-------|---------------|-------|
| Printed media | 1,385 | 914 | 194 | 2,493 |
| Broad-casting | 397 | 232 | 25 | 654 |
| Online media | 1,062 | 572 | 14 | 1,648 |
| Total | 2,844 | 1,718 | 233 | 4,795 |

Table 11.2: Number of front-page or table-of-contents pieces

| | Catalonia | Spain | International | Total |
|---------------|-----------|-------|---------------|-------|
| Printed Media | 244 | 175 | 23 | 442 |
| Broad-casting | 90 | 218 | 2 | 310 |

Table 11.3: Most common genres in printed press (%)

| | Catalonia | Spain | International |
|-----------|-----------|-------|---------------|
| News | 79.4 | 91.6 | 70.1 |
| Interview | 8.7 | 2.2 | 3.3 |
| Chronicle | 6.5 | 3.6 | 7.1 |
| Reportage | 5.4 | 2.6 | 19.0 |

Table 11.4: Most common genres in broadcast media (%)

| | Catalonia | Spain | International |
|-----------|-----------|-------|---------------|
| News | 91.9 | 100 | 84.0 |
| Interview | - | - | - |
| Chronicle | 5.5 | - | - |
| Reportage | 2.5 | - | 16.0 |

Table 11.5: Most common genres in online media (%)

| | Catalonia | Spain | International |
|-----------|-----------|-------|---------------|
| News | 99.7 | 87.9 | 85.7 |
| Interview | 0.3 | 3.5 | - |
| Chronicle | | 6.6 | 7.1 |
| Report | | 1.9 | 7.2 |

Table 11.6: Opinion articles typology (%)

| | Catalonia | Spain | International |
|----------------------|-----------|-------|---------------|
| Column | 63.3 | 63.5 | 31.3 |
| External pundit | 17.3 | 12.9 | 31.3 |
| In-depth article | 6.9 | 12.9 | 18.8 |
| Editorial | 6.8 | 9.8 | 10.4 |
| Letter to the editor | 5.8 | 0.9 | 8.3 |

Table 11.7: Main subjects in printed press headlines (%)

| Catalonia | Spain | International |
|------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Artur Mas (17.3) | Artur Mas (9.3) | Catalonia (29.9) |
| PSC (6.4) | Spanish gov't (6.0) | Mariano Rajoy (11.5) |
| ERC (6.4) | Mariano Rajoy (4.7) | Artur Mas (10.3) |

Table 11.8: Main subjects in broadcasting media (%)

| Catalonia | Spain | International |
|-------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Artur Mas (28.7) | Artur Mas (38.1) | Catalonia (70.0) |
| Generalitat (7.7) | Catalonia (6.7) | ICV (10.0) |
| CiU (6.9) | Mariano Rajoy (6.0) | Regional gov'ts (10.0) |

Table 11.9: Main subjects in online media (%)

| Catalonia | Spain | International |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Artur Mas (15.7) | Artur Mas (18.4) | Catalonia (62.5) |
| ERC (10.0) | PP (7.1) | Other (37.5) |
| PSC (8.0) | CiU (6.6) | |

Table 11.10: Typology of headlines (%)

| | General | International television | International online media |
|---------------|---------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| Evaluative | 63.1 | 28.0 | 42.9 |
| Referential | 33.5 | 28.0 | 17.4 |
| Inappropriate | 3.4 | 44.0 | 37.7 |

Table 11.11: Typology of international headlines (%)

| | Newspapers | Magazines | Online media | TV |
|----------|------------|-----------|--------------|------|
| Negative | 44.9 | 37.5 | 38.5 | 25.0 |
| Positive | 17.4 | 25.0 | 7.7 | 37.5 |
| Neutral | 37.7 | 37.5 | 53.8 | 37.5 |

Table 11.12: Ideology of print media contributors (%)

| | Catalonia | Spain | International |
|---------------|-----------|-------|---------------|
| Sovereignists | 59.5 | 3 | 12.5 |
| Unionists | - | 71.4 | 18.8 |
| Federalists | 0.8 | 2.3 | 2.1 |
| Unidentified | 2.2 | 23.3 | 66.7 |

Table 11.13: Ideology of online media contributors (%)

| | Catalonia | Spain |
|----------------|-----------|-------|
| Sovereigntists | 77 | 11.2 |
| Unionists | 10 | 54.3 |
| Federalists | 13 | 14.7 |
| Unidentified | - | 19.8 |

Table 11.14: Ideology of radio talk-show guests (%)

| | Catalonia | Spain |
|----------------|-----------|-------|
| Sovereigntists | 49.7 | 1.7 |
| Unionists | 9.6 | 61 |
| Federalists | 13 | 3.8 |
| Unidentified | 27.7 | 33.6 |

Table 11.15: Ideology of television talk-show guests (%)

| | Catalonia | Spain |
|----------------|-----------|-------|
| Sovereigntists | 45.5 | 5.9 |
| Unionists | 15.8 | 69.7 |
| Federalists | 23.4 | 5.3 |
| Unidentified | 15.3 | 19.1 |

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